Russia leaving European Convention for the Prevention of Torture: a withdrawal with profound consequences

Russia has withdrawn from the European Convention on Prevention of Torture. How do you assess this measure and what will be the consequences for prisoners, their families, civil society and more globally for the fight against torture in Russia?

Russia's decision to withdraw from the European Convention on Prevention of Torture marks a decisive break with the last remaining instrument of European oversight in the country. While Russia ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe in March 2022, it remained party to this Convention for three more years, making it the only state participating in the Convention outside the Council of Europe framework.

This withdrawal has profound consequences. For prisoners and detainees, it means the loss of the only independent international body with unrestricted access to all places of detention, including closed psychiatric hospitals. Over 27 years, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) conducted 30 visits to Russia and its reports directly influenced improvements in detention conditions: overcrowding was reduced, heating systems were installed in the colonies in the Republic of Mordovia, and protocols for using restraints in psychiatric facilities were reformed.

For families, this means fewer channels to raise concerns about their loved ones' treatment. For civil society, it eliminates a crucial source of objective information and international legitimacy for domestic advocacy efforts. The CPT's findings previously informed cases before the European Court of Human Rights and provided documented evidence that could not be easily dismissed by authorities.

More broadly, this withdrawal signals the Russian government's unwillingness to accept any form of external monitoring. The absence of international oversight creates conditions for the degradation of the penitentiary system, as authorities are no longer bound by commitments to meet European standards. The symbolic message is equally troubling: Russia is openly declaring that it does not consider international human rights standards applicable to its territory.

Are there any other independent national or international institutions that still have access to places of detention and closed institutions in Russia?

The situation regarding independent oversight of detention facilities in Russia is extremely limited. At the national level, there is the Public Monitoring Commission (ONK – abbreviated from Russian), but its independence has been significantly compromised in recent years. Members are now effectively selected by authorities rather than civil society, and critical voices have been systematically excluded. Their access, while formally guaranteed, is often obstructed in practice.

The Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) has some access rights, but this institution has become increasingly aligned with state policy and rarely produces critical assessments of detention conditions. Lawyers have access to their clients, but this is limited to individual consultation and does not constitute systematic monitoring.

At the international level, with the exit from the Council of Europe system, there are virtually no independent mechanisms with access to Russian detention facilities. The UN treaty bodies theoretically have mandates to a certain extent, but Russia has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, which would grant such access. Russia remains party to the UN Convention against Torture, but this only requires periodic reporting without providing independent monitors access to facilities. The activity of the UN CAT on individual cases is extremely limited due to the lack of human resources and its decisions often perceived by states as having a character of recommendation and not obligation in practice. In essence, closed psychiatric hospitals now have no independent oversight whatsoever, as the CPT was the only body with unrestricted access to these institutions.

Which populations are most vulnerable and need international attention?

Several populations are particularly vulnerable and require urgent international attention:

• Political prisoners and those detained for anti-war positions. This category has expanded dramatically since 2022. These individuals face not only harsh sentences but also deliberate mistreatment, denial of medical care, and placement in particularly severe conditions as a form of additional punishment. Recent cases include journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens prosecuted under laws against 'discrediting' the Russian armed forces.

• Patients in closed psychiatric hospitals. These individuals were the primary beneficiaries of CPT oversight, as this was the only mechanism that could access these facilities without restriction. They face risks of inappropriate medication, prolonged physical restraints, and isolation. Unlike prisoners who may have family visits or lawyers, many psychiatric patients have no outside contact for years.

• Detainees in pre-trial detention centers (SIZO) facilities. Conditions in pre-trial detention centers remain particularly harsh, with severe overcrowding, poor sanitation, and limited access to medical care. These facilities are also where torture is most likely to occur during interrogations, as detainees are most vulnerable before they have legal representation or their cases become public.

• Torture victims. With the elimination of external oversight, the risk of torture has increased significantly. Victims have fewer avenues for redress, and documentation of abuse is more difficult. The 2024 case of Alexei Navalny's death in detention, where the CPT's request for information was ignored, illustrates the complete lack of accountability.

This year marks three years since Russia withdrew from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and jurisdiction of European Court of Human Rights. What impact did this have, and are European standards still implemented in the national legislation?

The impact has been devastating for individual rights protection. For over two decades, the ECHR served as the ultimate avenue of redress when domestic courts failed. Between 1998 and 2022, Russia was found to have violated the Convention in thousands of cases, and the Court's judgments drove significant reforms in detention conditions, prison healthcare, and judicial procedures.

Since March 2022, Russian citizens have lost this final mechanism for justice. For cases filed before Russia's withdrawal, the Court continues to issue judgments, but Russia has declared it will not comply with them. New violations occurring after the withdrawal date cannot be brought before the Court at all. This creates a situation of complete impunity for human rights violations.

As for European standards in national legislation, the picture is mixed. Some provisions that were incorporated into Russian law following ECHR judgments remain formally in place, but their implementation has deteriorated sharply. Legal protections against torture remain in the Criminal Code, but prosecutions for torture have become exceptionally rare, and when they occur, sentences are minimal. At the same time, the amounts of the compensations for torture recently have grown up after expulsion from the Council of Europe.

More significantly, new legislation adopted since 2022 directly contradicts European human rights standards. Laws criminalizing “discrediting” the military, expanded definitions of treason and extremism, and restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly would certainly have been found incompatible with the Convention had Russia remained subject to the Court's jurisdiction. The government now openly promotes the concept that Russia follows its own “traditional values” rather than universal human rights standards, effectively rejecting the entire European human rights framework.

What is your hope for the future of Russian civil society?

Despite the darkest period for human rights in Russia in decades, I maintain hope for Russian civil society for several reasons:

• Resilience and adaptation. Russian civil society has proven remarkably resilient. When organisations are banned domestically, they continue work from exile. When traditional advocacy channels close, activists find new ways to document and report violations. This adaptability demonstrates that the spirit of civic engagement cannot be easily extinguished.

• Generational change. A new generation of Russians has grown up with access to information and exposure to international standards. Even under repression, many young people maintain values of human dignity and justice. This creates potential for future transformation when political circumstances allow.

• Preservation of memory and documentation. The work we do now in documenting violations, even when immediate accountability seems impossible, creates a historical record that will be crucial for future transitional justice processes. This documentation can support future prosecutions, truth commissions, and reforms.

• International solidarity. The continued attention of the international human rights community provides moral support and practical assistance to those still working in Russia or in exile. This solidarity ensures that Russian human rights defenders are not forgotten and that the international community maintains accountability mechanisms, even if Russia rejects them.

• Historical perspective. Russia has experienced cycles of repression and liberalisation throughout its history. No authoritarian system is permanent. The human rights community that emerged in the late Soviet period and flourished in the 1990s and 2000s was built on the foundation laid by dissidents during much darker times.

My hope is that the current rupture with European human rights institutions will not be permanent. Russia cannot indefinitely isolate itself from international norms. The question is not whether change will come, but when and how much suffering will occur before it does. Until then, we continue our work: documenting violations, supporting victims, training the next generation of human rights defenders, and maintaining the connection between Russia and the international human rights community.

The flame of civil society may be forced underground, but it has not been extinguished. And when the moment comes, this preserved knowledge, these networks of solidarity, and this commitment to human dignity will form the foundation for rebuilding a rights-respecting society in Russia.